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RECLASSIFICATION, VARIANCES, AND 'SPECIAL
EXCEPTIONS IN MARYLANDt
By ROBERT J. CARSON*
INTRODUCTION
Since the General Assembly enacted Maryland's initial
zoning enabling act in 1927, relating only to Baltimore City
and to cities and incorporated towns with more than 10,000
inhabitants,' thousands of landowners who have had their
properties zoned for particular uses have sought to legally
utilize them for other purposes. Well over a hundred
cases in this area have gone to the Court of Appeals.' More-
over, litigation has steadily increased as desirable land,
available for certain uses, such as commercial and in-
dustrial, has become more and more difficult to find.
The purpose of this article is to present the substantive
legal bases for reclassification, variances, and special ex-
ceptions. These three topics represent the methods by
which a person in Maryland today can legally use his
property for purposes other than those permitted by the
comprehensive zoning ordinance in force in his locality.'
Each method has its own peculiar characteristics and nor-
mally can be readily distinguished from the other methods,
t This article is based on a paper originally prepared for the 'Seminar
on Land Use and Contracts at the University 'of Maryland School of Law
under the supervision of Professor Russell R. Reno.
* Of the Harford County Bar; A.B. 1958, Gettysburg College; LL.B. 1961,
University of Maryland.1 MD. LAWS 1927, Ch. 705, §§ 1-9, now codified In 6 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66B, §§ 1-9.
" BROOKS, MARYLAND ZONING NOTES (1957), presents a compilation of
Maryland zoning decisions through Mettee v. County Comm., 212 Md. 357,
129 A. 2d 136 (1957). Also, Maryland zoning cases are now digested under
the topic "Zoning" in the current cumulative supplement to 15 MARYLAND
DIGEST, there having been no such topic in the original volume (Zoning
matters were originally digested under the topic "Municipal Corpora-
tions.").
8 Where a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to a certain
tract, the landowner may seek either an injunction or a declaratory decree
to prevent that ordinance from being enforced against him, even though
one or more of the three above-mentioned administrative remedies is also
available; Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339, 79 A. 2d 387 (1951);
Ellicott v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A. 2d 649 (1942). However,
if one of these three administrative remedies has been sought and denied,
and a statutory appeal from the zoning agency's decision is available, an
injunction or a declaratory decree is no longer possible; Baltimore v.
Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 123 A. 2d 207 (1956). The landowner in such a
situation may raise the point as to the constitutionality of the ordinance as
applied to him for the first time on appeal, even though the zoning agency
had no jurisdiction to decide this point; Backus v. County Bd. of Appeals
for Montgomery Co., 224 Md. 28, 166 A. 2d 241 (1960).
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but in some situations one method, or a modification
thereof, may be quite similar to another. Also, under
certain conditions more than one method may be success-
fully employed by the landowner.
STATUTORY SOURCES
At the present time there are four Maryland statutes
enabling the municipalities to enact zoning ordinances
and to establish the necessary mechanics for zoning, includ-
ing zoning boards. Each of these statutes differs from the
others to quite an extent, in effect as well as in language.
The initial enabling act, mentioned above,4 relates only
to Baltimore City and to cities and incorporated towns
with more than 10,000 inhabitants. A later enabling act
was passed in 1933 with reference to "counties, cities, and
other incorporated areas."5 Moreover, zoning in chartered
counties is today authorized under a separate statute;6 and
those parts of Montgomery County and Prince George's
County within the Maryland-Washington Regional Dis-
trict are governed by a public local law.7  Finally, to
further complicate this statutory maze, there may be a
public local law in force in any given locality, from
which that area derives in whole or in part its zoning
power.8
In addition to the aforegoing complexity, any two
municipalities, even though deriving their zoning authority
from the same statute, may of course have enacted very
dissimilar ordinances within the purview of that same
statute. Therefore, in the discussion to follow, no attempt
will be made to synthesize or catalogue the enabling
statutes or the ordinances in this State. The procedural
aspects of reclassification, variances, and special exceptions
shall for the same reason be omitted, since they vary
with each statute and each ordinance.
'Supra, n. 1.
MD. LAWS 1933, Ch. 599, §§ 12-14, now codified in 6 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66B, §§ 21-23.
e2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 25A, § 5(U) ; 2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1960)
Art. 25A, § 5(X).
7MD. LAWS 1959, ch. 780, passim. MD. LAWS 1927, ch. 448, originally
granted to the District its zoning powers. A statutory history is found
in Nelson v. Montgomery Co., 214 Md. 587, 593-4, 136 A. 2d 373 (1957).
1 For example, Baltimore County derived its zoning authority entirely
from public local law and not from the later enabling act in Art. 66B,
supra, n. 5, before becoming a chartered county, after which time it
derived such authority from Art. 25A, supra, n. 6; Baltimore County v. Mo.




Reclassification, or rezoning, is simply the amendment
of the existing zoning ordinance.9 We are here only in-
terested in the reclassification of a single landowner's tract,
sometimes called "piecemeal reclassification,"'10 and not in
comprehensive reclassification, i.e., the rezoning of an en-
tire municipality or a substantial part thereof, for which
different rules are applicable."
The power to reclassify a landowner's property may
lie in either the municipal legislative body or in the muni-
cipality's zoning board, 2 depending on the enabling
statute governing the municipality's zoning powers. If
this power does reside in the zoning board, it is regarded
as quasi-legislative and is given the same presumption of
constitutionality as reclassification by a municipality's
legislative body.'8
In Maryland the substantive requirements for valid
piecemeal reclassification present a most interesting judi-
cial history.14 In 1934 the Court of Appeals in Land Co.
v. Realty Co.'5 held a Baltimore City ordinance valid which
changed the property in question from a more restricted
residential use district to a less restricted one. Apparently
I See generally 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed.
1960) Chs. 27-28; 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1953)
§§ 83-89.
10 See, for example, McBee v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 312, 157 A. 2d
258 (1960).
1Comprehensive rezoning is given the same presumption of consti-
tutionality that is accorded original zoning, and the "change or mis-
take rule," which applies to piecemeal reclassification, does not apply to
comprehensive rezoning) ; Trustees v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 550,
158 A. 2d 637 (1960) ; McBee v. Baltimore County, 8upra, n. 10. Further-
more, the authority to comprehensively rezone would seem 'to lie in the
municipal legislative body rather than in the municipality's zoning board,
even though the authority to rezone in a piecemeal fashion may reside in
the latter. See Baltimore County v. Mo. Realty, 219 Md. 155, 148 A. 2d
424 (1959); and MD. LAWS 1959, Ch. 614, § 1, now codified in 2 MD. CODE
(Cum. Supp. 1960) Art. 25A, § 5(X), legislation evidently enacted as a
result of this case.
1See Baltimore County v. Mo. Realty, id., where the Court of Appeals
held the General Assembly could by statute validly authorize the Zoning
Commissioner of Baltimore County to reclassify property without the
approval of the County's legislative body.
ISee, for example, Offutt v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 105
A. 2d 219 (1954).
MD. LAWS 1959, Ch. 780, § 79(1), adopted the "competent, material
and substantial evidence" rule for the appropriate scope of review of
piecemeal reclassification in those parts of Montgomery County and Prince
George's County within the Maryland-Washington Regional District.
See Bd. of Co. Comm. v. Walcraft, 224 Md. 610, 168 A. 2d 892 (1961).
1" See Note, Validity of A Rezoning Ordinance in Maryland, 13 Md L. Rev.
242 (1953), for an interesting but somewhat dated discussion of this area.
167 Md. 185, 172 A. 911 (1934).
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the protestants' counsel did not contend that the power to
rezone a particular tract is substantively a more restricted
power than the power to zone initially and comprehen-
sively. At any rate, the Court did not discuss this point.
Seven years later, the Court of Appeals in Chayt v.
Maryland Jockey Club' relied in part upon the Land Co.
result in holding that an "amending ordinance placing
nearby properties in a lower classification, and to that
extent freeing such properties from the burdens of the
original ordinance" was valid, since the protesting adjacent
landowners had no "vested right" in the orginal zoning
ordinance."7 The Court recognized that "restriction ... upon
private property can only be justified where they are re-
quired for the reasonable protection of the public health,
morals, safety, or welfare," but stated, "[wle have been
cited no case applying this principle to a situation of re-
zoning from a higher to a lower class."'8 The case involved
the land immediately outside the Pimlico racetrack fence
which had previously been a parking lot, this having been
a non-conforming use because the land was zoned resi-
dential, as was the entire racetrack property. The Jockey
Club wanted to build a stable there, and the Baltimore
City Council enacted the amending ordinance, reclassifying
the entire racetrack property as commercial, after an in-
junction had restrained issuance of a permit for the
stable. 9 It seems apparent that the property should have
been zoned commercial originally, especially since the
areas immediately south and west of the racetrack had been
so classified. And although the Court did mention that
the rezoning ordinance only did what could validly have
been done in the beginning, it nevertheless spoke in much
broader language in reaching its result.
In 1950, Cassel v. City of Baltimore0 again presented
the Court of Appeals with the question of the validity of an
ordinance which rezoned property from a higher to a lower
use district. Here the Court unanimously held that the
Baltimore City Council could not constitutionally rezone so
that a funeral home would be allowed in a residential
district, stating that such reclassification "is ordinarily
" 179 Md. 390, 18 A. 2d 856 (1941). Cf., N. W. Merchants Term. v.
O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A. 2d 743 (1948) (quoting Chayt with approval
in that a landowner has no vested right in the classification of neighboring
property - but 'the Court recognized that piecemeal reclassification is not
given as great a presumption of validity as original zoning).
17 Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 395, 18 A. 2d 856 (1941).
Ibid.
Chayt v. Zoning Appeals Board, 177 Md. 426, 9 A. 2d 747 (1939).
195 Md. 348, 73 A. 2d 486 (1950).
1961]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
invalid because it provides for unreasonable and discrimin-
tory 'spot zoning' beyond the statutory power of the city."'"
Neither the Land Co. case nor the Chayt case were men-
tioned in the opinion.
Shortly after Cassel was decided, the Court had before
it a case, Kracke v. Weinberg,22 wherein a property owner
with land formerly zoned for commercial use and fit for
no other use, had had his tract rezoned for residential use.
The Court of Appeals held the rezoning ordinance invalid
and stated what is today the law of Maryland:
"Where property is rezoned, it must appear that either
there was some mistake in the original zoning, or that
the character of the neighborhood has changed to such
an extent that such action ought to be taken. Neither
situation is present in the case before us. The prop-
erty has always been commercial and apparently there
is little chance of its ever being used for residence
purposes. Rezoning to residential results in preventing
the owners from using it, not only for its most suitable
use, but for any practical use at all. Under these cir-
cumstances, their property is being taken from them
without compensation, and we think the ordinance was
void as to it."2
No reference to the former cases of Land Co., Chayt, and
Cassel was made in the opinion, but they may have been
thought not in point since they dealt with reclassification
from a higher to a lower use district.
Finally, in Wakefield v. Kraft 4 a divided (3-2) Court
applied the "change or mistake rule" to the situation in
which land is rezoned from a higher to a lower use district,
Judge Hammond stating for the majority that:
"[The] presumption of reasonableness and constitu-
tionality applies to rezoning as well as to original zon-
21 Id., 356-357.
- 197 Md. 339, 79 A. 2d 387 (1951), noted 13 Md. L. Rev. 242 (1953).
1 Id., 347. Emphasis added. 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING (3d ed. 1960) Oh. 27, § 1, p. 399, states that the wisest policy
is only to amend under these circumstances, although not speaking
specifically of any jurisdiction's rule In relation to this statement. 1
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1961) § 84, speaks
of the Maryland rule as a "modern expression" of the limitation upon the
power to reclassify.
202 Md. 136, 141, 96 A. 2d 27 (1953). See also Baltimore County v.
Mo. Realty, 219 Md. 155, 148 A. 2d 424 (1959); Zinn v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 207 Md. 355, 114 A. 2d 614 (1955); Offutt v. Bd of Zoning
Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 105 A. 2d 219 (1954) ; American Oil Co. v. Miller,
204 Md. 32, 102 A. 2d 727 (1954) ; Zang & Sons, Builders, Inc. v. Taylor,
203 Md. 628, 102 A. 2d 723 (1954).
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ing, though not with as great force. This is so because
it is presumed that the original zoning was well
planned, and designed to be permanent; it must appear,
therefore, that either there was a mistake in the origi-
nal zoning or that the character of the neighborhood
was changed to an extent which justifies the amenda-
tory action."2 5
Although the majority here apparently approved the result
in Chayt,26 that case's language was criticized as too broad."
Judge Hammond, while agreeing with Chayt that a prop-
erty owner has no vested interest in the continuance of a
zoning classification for a neighboring area, nevertheless
thought that:
"He is entitled to rely on the rule that a classification
made by ordinance will not be changed unless the
change is required for the public good and is not made
merely to accommodate private interests which are
detrimental to the welfare of the other property
owners of the same neighborhood."2
Paradoxically perhaps, the majority in Wakefield sus-
tained the ordinance which had rezoned a tract at an in-
tersection from a residential to a commercial district. Two
non-conforming commercial uses and a lot recently re-
classified to commercial were also present at the inter-
section. Judge Hammond felt the evidence presented at
the hearing before the Howard County Commissioners sus-
tained their action, specifically mentioning that the fact
that the property could be used as a "facility" for the
residential neighborhood presented a valid reason for re-
zoning. Chief Judge Sobeloff, writing the dissenting
opinion, while not disagreeing with Judge Hammond's
statement of the applicable zoning law, thought that the
facts showed the reclassification was for "a private and
not a public benefit" '29 because the landowner's future
plans for the tract were not clearly shown and seemed
to be for an automobile business rather than for stores to
serve the neighborhood.
It is probably best to mention at this point that the
question as to whether or not piecemeal reclassification







is reasonable in the light of the above-discussed substantive
requirements, must be answered from the facts on which
the municipal legislative body or the zoning board based its
conclusions, rather than from the conclusions themselves.
The personal knowledge of members of the municipal
government or of the zoning board cannot be evidence, only
those facts ascertained at the public hearing.80 Of course
the applicant for reclassification has the burden of showing
a change in conditions or a mistake in the original zoning.8
Moreover, although the municipal legislative bodies and
the zoning boards are very interested in knowing the
specific use that will be made of property if rezoned, 2 they
have no right to require conditions or the promise of a
certain use from the landowner in return for reclassifi-
cation, either by written contract or otherwise, since such
conditions or such promise are deemed antithetical to the
uniformity necessary within each use district.33 However,
the landowner's evidence as to his proposed use may be
decisive of the question as to whether or not the rezoning
is reasonable.3 4
"Spot zoning' '3 5 is an interesting aspect of piecemeal
reclassification and has presented the Court of Appeals
with a problem of definition ever since that term was in-
troduced into the zoning jargon of this State. In Chayt v.
Maryland Jockey Club3" the Court mentioned that "'spot'
zoning ... as usually defined, signifies a carving out of one
or more properties located in a given use district and re-
classifying them in a different use district." However,
in Cassell v. City of Baltimore37 a spot zoning ordinance
was said to be one which singled out a piece of property
and gave it a use classification purely for the owner's
benefit and inconsistent with the uses permitted in the
rest of the area involved. Having created these divergent
"0 See, for example, Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 489,
497, 109 A. 2d 85 (1954) ; American Oil Co. v. Miller, 8upra, n. 24.
uSee, for example, Reese v. Mandel, 224 Md. 121, 167 A. 2d 11 (1961).
8See, for example, Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A. 2d 27 (1953),
discussed 8upra, circa n. 29, regarding this point.
"Citizens Ass'n v. Pr. Geo. County, 222 Md. 44, 158 A. 2d 663 (1960);
Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A. 2d 618 (1960) ; Wakefield v. Kraft,
202 Md. 136, 96 A. 2d 27 (1953).
"Supra, n. 32.
"See generally 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed.
1960) Ch. 26; 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1953)§§ 90-95; Annotation, 51 A.L.R. 2d 263 (1957).
179 Md. 390, 393, 18 A. 2d 856 (1941).
- 195 Md. 348, 73 A. 2d 486 (1950). Cf. Hedin v. lBd. of Co. Commis-
sioners, 209 Md. 224, 120 A. 2d 663 (1956) (reclassification from higher
residential use district to lower one held not spot zoning where much of
the adjacent property was already in the less restrictive district).
[VOL. XXI
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definitions, the Court in Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals8
chose a definition in line with that of the Chayt case:
"When a zoning ordinance or an amendment puts a
small area in a zone different from that of the sur-
rounding area, we have what may be called 'spot
zoning', using the term in a descriptive sense. Such
zoning may be invalid or valid. If it is an arbitrary
and unreasonable devotion of the small area to a use
inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the
district is restricted and made for the sole benefit of
the private interests of the owner, it is invalid. Cassel
v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 355. On the other
hand, if the zoning of the small parcel is in accord and
in harmony with the comprehensive zoning plan and
is done for the public good - that is, to serve one or
more of the purposes of the enabling statute, and so
bears a substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare, it is valid."39
As we have already seen in Wakefield v. Kraft,4° re-
zoning to provide a business "facility" for a residential
neighborhood may be valid spot zoning, using that term in
its now accepted sense. The Court has specified several
acceptable facilities:
"Generally . . . there is no inherent objection to the
creation of small districts within a residential zone for
the operation of such establishments as grocery stores,
drug stores, barber shops, and even gasoline stations,
for the accommodation and convenience of the resi-
dents of the residential zone." 41
Reclassification for a shopping center, combining several of
these facilities, has been upheld where a definite need for
such a center was shown. 2
Traffic conditions are extremely important in deter-
mining the validity of such reclassification. The roads must
be adequate for the expected increase in traffic, and the
- 214 Md. 48, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957). See also Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 167, 148 A. 2d 429 (1959) (" 'Spot zoning' is a term used in
many of the zoning cases, but as a descriptive term rather than a word
of art.").
Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 57, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957).
"See supra, circa ns. 25-29.
"Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 489, 495, 109 A. 2d 85
(1954).
" See, for example, Eckes v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 209 Md. 432,
121 A. 2d 249 (1956).
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projected flow cannot create a hazard.43 However, the
virtual certainty of immediate road improvement4 3a or
new road construction1b can form the basis for valid
reclassification, and perhaps a reasonable probability of
either might be sufficient.43 c
Naturally, some businesses are viewed with the utmost
scrutiny. Thus, a funeral home has been found to have no
place in a residential use district.44 Gasoline stations have
only been permitted where there was a need for such a
facility to service the neighborhood, predicated at least in
part upon the absence of other stations in the area.45
Finally, if an entire area seems misclassified, piecemeal
alterations are invalid, and the land use map should be
resurveyed and a comprehensive reclassification made, not
merely a change for one particular tract."
VARIANCES AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS DIFFERENTIATED
The Maryland law of variances and special exceptions
has probably caused as much difficulty for the Court of
Appeals as any other zoning area in the past thirty-five
years. Yet it was not until 1953 and Montgomery Co. v.
Merlands Club47 that the Court clearly distinguished the
two creatures:
"The Courts have often drawn distinctions between
special exceptions and variances in zoning ordinances.
In Application of Devereux Foundation, Zoning Case,
351 Pa. 478, 41 A. 2d 744, 746, the Court well stated
the difference thus: 'An "exception" in a zoning ordi-
nance is one allowable where facts and conditions
detailed in the ordinance, as those upon which an
Temmink v. Bd of Zoning Appeals, 212 Md. 6, 128 A. 2d 256 (1957)
(roads inadequate for shopping center, and traffic problem would be
created. See also Howard County v. Merryman, 222 Md. "314, 159 A. 2d
854 (1960) ; Price v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 132 A. 2d 125 (1957).
"INelson v. Montgomery Co., 214 Md. 587, 596, 136 A. 2d 373 (1957).
Sb Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Rnamer, 216 Md. 442, 450-1, 140 A. 2d 655
(1958).
" Cf. Howard County v. Merryman, supra, n. 43, 323.
"Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A. 2d 486 (1950),
discussed supra, circa, n. 20.
"'American Oil Co. v. Miller, 204 Md. 32, 102 A. 2d 727 (1954) (rezoning
from "Agricultural" to "Heavy Commercial" invalid where sufficient
stations already existed and numerous "Heavy Commercial" sites were
still available for stations) ; Ellicott v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176,
23 A. 2d 649 (1942) ("reclassification" by Baltimore City "special ex-
ception" from residential to commercial use district valid where existing
stations were not sufficient to service present traffic). See also, West
Ridge, Inc. v. McNamara, 222 Md. 448, 160 A. 2d 907 (1960).
Zinn v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 207 Md. 355, 114 A. 2d 614 (1955).
' 202 Md. 279, 96 A. 2d 261 (1953).
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exception may be permitted, are found to exist. But
zoning ordinances usually provide, as does the present
one, for another kind of dispensation also permitted
by the statute, by which a "variance" from the terms
of the ordinance may be authorized in cases where a
literal enforcement of its provisions would result in
unnecessary hardship.' * * *
"It is the common practice to join an application for
an exception with an application for a variance, leav-
ing it to the Board to decide on which ground it will
grant the application. As a result, many cases discuss
exceptions and variances without differentiation, yet
the two do differ, and one important distinction is that
where a specific use is permitted by the legislative
body in a given area if the general zoning plan is con-
formed to and there is no adverse affect on the neigh-
borhood, the application can be granted without a
showing of hardship or other conditions which are
necessary for the allowance of a variance."48
VARIANCES
Much of the difficulty in differentiating between the
variance and the special exception in Maryland was caused
by the language of the earlier enabling act and the Balti-
more City ordinances enacted under it. The original en-
abling act spoke of "special exceptions to the terms of the
ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and intent
and in accordance with general or specific rules therein
contained," which were to be permitted "in appropriate
cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safe-
guards.'49 Pursuant to this statute, Baltimore City, by
ordinance, allowed its Board of Zoning Appeals to "grant a
permit [for a 'special exception'] when there are any
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way
of carrying out the strict letter of any of the provisions of
this ordinance."' 0 This delegation of power to the Board
was subsequently held void as too general and indefinite.5
Thereafter, Baltimore City added new provisions to the
former phrase which were very exact, even delineating the
specific physical conditions necessary.
"I., 288-289. Emphasis added.
" 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66B, § 7(a).
0Ordinance 1247, 33(b), approved March 20, 1931.
wSugar v. North Balto. M. E. Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 A. 703 (1933);
Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933).
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The Court of Appeals, construing these Baltimore City
"special exceptions" (which were, of course, really vari-
ances52 ) strictly, then consistently found in a long line of
cases that no adequate showing of hardship had been
made.58 Two cases involving these "special exceptions"
which did, in fact, end favorably to the property owners,
are very revealing as to the Court's attitude. In the first,
the Court upheld the grant of an "exception" upon an
analogy to reclassification, finding changed traffic condi-
tions to provide a valid reason to permit a gas station
facility.54 In the second, the Court, ruling for the first
time on appeal upon the validity of the original ordinance,
held that it was unconstitutional as applied to the land-
owner.
55
While these relatively recent cases may seem anachron-
istic today because of the statutory language involved, the
rules therein contained are no doubt valid when applied to
a bona fide variance in name as well as in substance. Thus,
the Court of Appeals will require that the landowner sus-
tain a unique and substantial hardship in order to be
granted a variance, which hardship must apply to him
personally and not be common in the neighborhood. A
variance will not be granted merely to make the applicant's
property more profitable or its use more convenient for
him. Moreover, if the landowner has himself created the
situation, as when he buys property with the intention of
applying for a variance, he cannot be heard to complain. 6
Even if a variance is granted, conditions may validly be
attached to the grant.5 7 Of course, the "heavy" burden of
proof before the zoning board is upon the applicant, and the
Court of Appeals in review will require that the board's
52 See Serio v. City of Baltimore, 208 Md. 545, 119 A. 2d 887 (1956)
(Baltimore City "special exception" called a "variance"). Cf., Marino
v. City of Baltimore, 215 Md. 206, 216, 137 A. 2d 198 (1957), which said,
"Ordinarily, there is a marked distinction in the law of zoning between
a variance and an eoception, but there is none In Baltimore City since
an excption, apparently, overlaps a variance inasmuch as both may be
granted where there are 'practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships'."
5 'Cleland v. City of Baltimore, 198 Md. 440, 84 A. 2d 49 (1951);
Gleason v. Keswick Impvt. Ass'n, 197 Md. 46, 78 A. 2d 164 (1951) ; Easter
v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 395, 73 A. 2d 491 (1950) ; Heath v. Mayor
& C.C. of Balto., 190 Md. 478, 58 A. 2d 896 (1948) ; M. & C.C. of Balto. v.
Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A. 2d 804 (1947) ; Heath v. M. & C.C. of Balto.,
187 Md. 296, 49 A. 2d 799 (1946).
5 'Ellicott v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A. 2d 649 (1942).
Hoffman v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 294, 79 A. 2d 367 (1951).
See cases collected supra, n. 53.




grant of a variance be supported by real and substantial
evidence.58
Upholding the grant of a variance is no minor task.
As stated above,5 9 the only successful property owners in
the Court of Appeals to this date seem to have been those
for whom other relief, such as reclassification or an injunc-
tion or declaratory decree,6" would have been appropriate.
SPECIAL ExCEPTONS
A special exception is normally required for certain
uses because they are marginal, that is, because they are
generally valid uses within a district but may be invalid in
some parts of the district by causing, for example, traffic
problems, or a health menace, or an obnoxious or ex-
tremely displeasing appearance or emission." Therefore
the legislative body requires a special exception for such
uses so that the zoning board will only permit them where
they will not be detrimental to the general neighborhood.
Conditions can be exacted of the landowner by the board,
thus further insuring that the use will not adversely
affect the area.2
The Court of Appeals has held that a use for which a
special exception is sought is prima facie valid, although
the applicant does seem to have the burden of going forth
with the evidence. 63 Reasons against the granting of an
exception, to be cogent, must relate specifically to the
property in question and not to the entire district. 4
Furthermore, it will be presumed that the municipality's
health regulations will prevent the proposed use from
creating a health problem."6 Of course, the use requested
must conform to the general zoning plan.66
"See cases collected supra, n. 53.
" See supra, circa ns. 54-55.
"0 See discussion 8upra, circa n. 3.
61Dorsey Enterprises v. Shpak, 219 Md. 16, 147 A. 2d 853 (1959);
Montgomery Co. v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A. 2d 261 (1953).
"Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Md. 379, 170 A. 2d 768 (1961) (dictum);
Citizens Ass'n v. Pr. Geo. County, 222 Md. 44, 158 A. 2d 663 (1960)
(dictum); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A. 2d 429 (1959)
(dictum); Dorsey Enterprises v. Shpak, Id. (Applicant willing to abide by
Board's conditions).
"See, for example, Dorsey Enterprises v. Shpak, 8upra, n. 61; Mont-
gomery Co. v. Merlands Club, 8upra, n. 61.
"Ibid.
"Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 8upra, n. 62; Montgomery Co. v. Merlands
Club, supra, n. 61. 0f., Dorsey Enterprises v. Shpak, supra, n. 61.
w Dorsey Enterprises v. Shpak, supra, n. 61; Erdman v. Bd. of Zon.
Appeals, 212 Md. 288, 129 A. 2d 124 (1957); Oursler v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 204 Md. 397, 104 A. 2d 568 (1954) ; Montgomery Co. v. Merlands
Club, supra, n. 61.
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In several cases the Court of Appeals seemed to regard
the zoning board's action in granting a special exception to
be quasi-legislative and accorded such action the strong
presumption of constitutionality. 7 However, a very recent
case, Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson,68 may throw some doubt
on the scope of review applicable, the Court there stating:
"The appellant's first contention is that the trial
court erred when it held that the board is acting in a
quasi-legislative capacity when it decides cases in-
volving special exceptions, and hence the court con-
fined itself to a too narrow scope of review in this case.
In this case we feel it makes no real difference whether
the board's action is considered as quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative for even under the broader scope of review
claimed as to quasi-judicial action, we think that there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the board's conclu-
sion.
The general rule is that in reviewing the action of
zoning boards a court will not substitute its judg-
ment for the judgment of the board unless its action
is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or illegal ...
But if the questions involved are fairly debatable and
the facts presented are sufficient to support the board's
decision it must be upheld."69
At any rate, "a wide latitude of discretion in passing upon
special exceptions""° is given to the zoning boards by the
Court of Appeals.
Thus, it might fairly be said, by way of doggerel, that:
"While the Court has looked askance at the variance,
It has regarded with affection the special exception."
Indeed, so favorable has been the Court of Appeal's atti-
tude toward this device that it has upheld a floating manu-
facturing zone in Baltimore County, a use district that
could be assigned by the zoning board to property meeting
certain specified conditions, by an analogy to the special
exception, and therefore applicants for this classification
need not show a change in conditions or a mistake in the
comprehensive zoning since the classification is deemed
presumptively correct.71
Ibid.
225 Md. 379, 170 A. 2d 768 (1961).
Id., 383. Of., Snowden v. Mayor & C.C. of Balto., 224 Md. 443, 168 A. 2d
390 (1961), where the Court, in a non-conforming use case, broadly stated
that the "substantial evidence test" is applicable in review of zoning mat-
ters and that therefore the result below must be "reasonable, 'not right'."
Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Md. 379, 383, 170 A. 2d 768 (1961).
"7 Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A. 2d 83 (1957).
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CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the law of reclassification, variance,
and special exceptions has been anything but static in the
past thirty-five years. It presents an interesting, if at times
vacillating history, and clearly shows a Court's increased
wisdom accompanying increased familiarity in the field.
There can be no doubt that ambiguity and uncertainty still
exist, but the clarifying process seems well under way.
